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1.  Introduction 
 
Immigration from developing countries to developed economies can generate substantial 
positive effects for the host countries. One of the reasons is that the growth of the labor force 
in developed countries is expected to slow down, and that the labor force will eventually 
decline, within the next 20 years. This will lead to rising dependency ratios, i.e. the ratio of 
the  non-working to the  working population  will increase, which puts a strain on public 
budgets. In Germany, the situation is even worse than in most other developed economies. 
The share of the working-age population (20-60) has already been shrinking since the 1980s. 
Without immigration, the dependency ratio is expected to rise from 45.2 (people ≥60 years 
per 100 persons aged 20-59) in 2005 to 101.3 in 2050 (Statistisches Bundesamt  2006). 
Migration could help to reduce dependency ratios. In order to have a noticeable impact on 
dependency ratios, however, the volume of immigration would have to be substantial. Even 
with an annual net migration of 300,000 persons, the German dependency ratio would still 
increase to 80.3 in 2050.
1 This raises the need for selective migration policies (cf. World 
Bank 2006). If migration can be restricted to skilled and experienced workers, the fiscal cost 
of a rapidly aging population could be mitigated. Examining the interplay of immigrants’ 
economic performance and immigration policy in Europe, Constant and Zimmermann (2005) 
find that, in particular, Germany could benefit from targeting its integration policies more at 
immigrants with strong economic performance, i.e. selecting skilled migrants.
2
In recent years, many developed countries have implemented selective migration policies, 
using systems of quotas, points, and targeted programs (cf. OECD 2007). Some countries, 
such as Italy, have opted for quotas. Other countries, for example the Netherlands, have 
chosen a points-system along the lines of the ones long in use in Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand. Japan introduced a targeted program to increase the opportunities for immigration of 
researchers and engineers specializing in information systems. In 2000, Germany 
implemented a policy (named “Green Card” after the US model) which was supposed to 
attract IT-specialists to fill an urgent supply gap of this type of workers. One of the 
requirements to obtain a “Green Card” was a minimum annual salary of 50,000 Euros. The 
 
                                                 
 
1  In 2007, 680,766  persons immigrated to Germany, while 636,854 left the country. Thus, net migration 
amounted to 43,912 persons (Statistisches Bundesamt 2009). 
2 Germany refused until the late 1990s to consider itself an immigration-receiving country but experienced more 
immigration per capita than the US in almost all years after World War II (Schmidt and Zimmermann, 1992). In 
2006, 7.3 million foreigners were living in Germany. In addition, about 2.5 million ethnic Germans immigrated 
between 1990 and 2006. In 2000, a new naturalization law was passed in Germany which relaxed barriers to 
naturalization. Between 2000 and 2006, more than 1 million foreigners became German citizens. Today, about 
one-fifth of the population are either foreign-born or descendants of foreign-born. Right-Wing Extremism and the Well-Being of Immigrants 
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European Union is  also pursuing  plans to create an “EU Blue Card”. This program is 
supposed to make immigration to the EU more attractive for highly qualified workers by 
creating a fast-track to obtain work permits and by granting favorable conditions for family 
reunification and movement across the EU. As these examples show, attracting high-skilled 
workers is one of the core aims of immigration policies in developed economies. 
Despite the potential benefits of immigration to developed economies, public opinion with 
respect to immigration  has deteriorated in the face of high unemployment and strained 
welfare systems in many European countries. Native populations are concerned that migrants, 
as recipients of generous social transfers, are more of a fiscal burden than contributors to the 
domestic economy. Boeri  (2009) reports that the fraction of EU natives in favor of 
repatriating migrants if they are long-term unemployed has increased threefold in Spain, 
twofold in France and Italy, and between one third and one quarter in the UK and Germany 
between 2002 and 2009. An extreme manifestation of this development is the growing 
prevalence of right-wing and xenophobic political attitudes and increasing support for right-
wing political parties among native populations. In Germany, the number of right-wing 
extremists has more than doubled between 1990 and 2005 (Siedler, 2007). The number of 
violent and non-violent right-wing crimes has increased accordingly.  
From an economic perspective, right-wing activities may have a number of negative 
effects. First, anti-foreign sentiments in the host population may deter immigration. On the 
one hand, sentiments may feed into the political process through the enactment of laws that 
are disadvantageous to migrants. On the other hand, they may lead to more experiences of 
personal hostility. Both reasons could be expected to harm the economic development and 
integration of immigrants. However, incomplete economic integration could also imply 
negative effects for  the host population. For example, Epstein and Gang (2006) provide 
evidence that ethnic networks play a role in international trade, particularly in overcoming 
informal barriers (information costs, risk,  and uncertainty) to trade by building trust and 
substituting for the difficulty of enforcing contracts internationally. 
Second, the prevalence of right-wing attitudes may influence patterns of migration. If 
certain regions of a country are (in)famous for xenophobic attitudes of the native population, 
immigrants may leave these areas or people may be deterred from moving into those regions. 
In a recent survey among 300 German companies (Bussmann and Werle 2004), 5 (11) percent 
of West (East) German firms reported that regional xenophobia and right-wing violence 
already had an impact on their business, and 17 (28) percent of all firms expect that these 
factors could influence future business decisions (again). Up to 40 percent of all firms stated Right-Wing Extremism and the Well-Being of Immigrants 
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that xenophobia in the region affected their recruitment strategies. 4 (11) percent of West 
(East) German  firms reported that prospective employees declined job offers explicitly 
because of fear of xenophobia in the firm’s region, and even more firms suspect that the 
prevalence of right-wing attitudes is the real reason behind declined job offers. Bussmann and 
Werle (2004) also show that firms with R&D departments are especially sensitive to right-
wing extremism because they rely on high-skilled international personnel. Finally, right-wing 
extremism may limit the attractiveness of regions as locations for business investment; hence, 
this may hamper economic growth. 
A number of studies has analyzed the determinants of anti-foreign perceptions and right-
wing crime, e.g. Krueger and Pischke (1997),  Dustmann and Preston (2001),  Fertig and 
Schmidt (2002), and Siedler (2007). These studies consistently show that, in addition to a 
person’s level of education, the economic situation of one’s home region plays a decisive role 
in determining the strength of anti-foreign sentiments. To the best of our knowledge, existing 
studies concentrate on the native population’s economic well-being and political attitudes 
only. They do not consider how the attitudes and the behavior of the native population affect 
the economic and subjective well-being of immigrants. This latter question is important, 
however, because it determines the attractiveness of a country for high-skilled immigrants. 
In this paper, we want to study how xenophobia and right-wing extremism affect a region’s 
attractiveness for migrants with different skill levels. As a measure for the prevalence of 
xenophobia in a region and this region’s attractiveness for (high-skilled) immigration, we use 
the share of votes received by political parties on the extreme right in parliamentary elections 
at the state level and the life satisfaction of (high-skilled) migrants living in the respective 
state. The empirical analysis is based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(SOEP) for the years 1984 to 2006 merged with state-level information on election outcomes. 
We estimate how the voting behavior of the residents’ population affects immigrants’ life 
satisfaction. Using data on right-wing voting behavior has two advantageous features for the 
question at hand: first, it is an exogenous variable in the estimation of foreigners’ life-
satisfaction because foreigners are not allowed to vote in Germany; second, it provides a good 
approximation of right-wing attitudes in the native population that is not influenced by 
subjective perceptions reported by the migrants themselves. 
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in the following respects. First, this study 
explores the effects of right-wing extremism of the host country’s population on the well-
being of immigrants. Thus, it extends existing studies that restrict their attention to the 
resident population when analyzing attitudes towards immigration and related issues. Second, Right-Wing Extremism and the Well-Being of Immigrants 
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by distinguishing between high-skilled and low-skilled immigrants, we are able to analyze to 
what extent recent policy reforms that aim at increasing the share of high-skilled immigrants 
through targeted immigration programs are offset by deterrent right-wing attitudes.  
Our results show that immigrants in Germany experience, on average, lower life-
satisfaction than natives. We also find that the life satisfaction of immigrants is significantly 
reduced if right-wing attitudes in the native population increase, i.e. higher vote shares for the 
extreme right are associated with lower subjective well-being of immigrants. The results are 
robust to changes in the  estimation method applied or the specification of the model. 
Moreover, we can clearly establish an educational effect: the life satisfaction of highly 
educated immigrants is affected more strongly by right-wing attitudes of the host population 
than that of low-skilled immigrants. This supports the view that policies aimed at making 
immigration more attractive to the high-skilled have to include measures that reduce 
xenophobic attitudes in the native population. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents a review of the relevant 
literature. In section 3, we present the  empirical methodology. Section 4 contains a 
description of the data and the empirical results are provided in section 5. The final section 
concludes.  
2.  Related Literature 
Xenophobia and other hostile attitudes to immigrants and issues related to immigration are 
potentially important determinants of the social exclusion and the welfare of ethnic 
minorities. They may reduce the life satisfaction of immigrants, on the one hand, indirectly 
through their impact on the political process (e.g. represented by votes, laws and prejudices), 
and, on the other hand, directly through experiences of personal hostility (Dustmann and 
Preston, 2001). From an economic perspective, this may result in reduced economic 
performance of the immigrants and may affect the patterns of migration inasmuch as people 
may fear to move to certain locations or decide to leave those areas. In addition, anti-foreign 
sentiments may limit a region’s attractiveness for business investment, reducing economic 
growth and trade (Siedler, 2007). 
Previous research on attitudes to immigration has focused on the residents’ population. 
Fertig and Schmidt (2002) study the perceptions of native Germans with respect to foreigners 
and Jews using data of the 1996 ALLBUS survey (a large German opinion survey). Based on 
the estimation of a structural model to take account of unobserved heterogeneity, their results 
show that perceptions only depend on the level of education (where those with better Right-Wing Extremism and the Well-Being of Immigrants 
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education have a more positive attitude), while labor market situation or age turn out to be 
insignificant. A similar question is analyzed by Dustmann and Preston (2001, 2005). In their 
2001 study (based on the British Social Attitudes Survey), they estimate the determinants of 
attitudes of ethnic majority populations towards ethnic minorities in England using ethnic 
concentration in the region as the variable of interest. To take account of ethnic concentration 
in the locality, which may be a determinant, but also an outcome, of the attitudes of the 
majority population, they suggest the use of a spatial estimator. Their results indicate that high 
concentrations of ethnic minorities could lead to more hostile attitudes, but that the 
relationship will be overestimated if the endogeneity of ethnic concentration is not addressed 
seriously in the estimation. In addition, Dustmann and Preston (2005) analyze the effects of 
labor market competition, which is frequently perceived as one of the main driving forces 
determining public attitudes towards immigration. In particular, they hypothesize that those 
for whose skills immigrant labor is likely to be a substitute may oppose immigration whereas 
those  to  whose skills it is complementary may view immigration more sympathetically. 
Moreover, they argue that the formation of opinions and attitudes towards immigration should 
be addressed with a broadening of the economic argument: not only factors relating to labor 
market competition, but also factors relating to the public budget and economic efficiency 
considerations should be taken into account. Based on data from the European Social Survey 
(ESS), their estimates show a strong relationship between education and more positive 
attitudes towards various issues relating to migration. 
Other  studies analyze the  determinants of right-wing extremism. Krueger and Pischke 
(1997) investigate the causes of crime against foreigners in Germany shortly after German 
unification based on a regional analysis (county-level) where anti-foreign incidents are 
collected from newspaper recordings. Their results show clear differences in the incident rates 
between East and West Germany; in the East, incidents occur mostly in rural regions farther 
from the western part, in the West, incidents occur in urban/metropolitan areas. Moreover, the 
incidence of anti-foreigner crime is unrelated to the unemployment rate in the region (as a 
proxy for local economic conditions) when controlling for East-West differences. This is 
similar to findings for the US, e.g. Land et al. (1990). Although the findings of Krueger and 
Pischke (1997) indicate no direct connection between violence against foreigners and poor 
economic conditions in the East, the authors are cautious with respect to the robustness of 
their findings as the relationship between both may be more complex. Falk and Zweimüller 
(2005)  reinvestigate a closely related question using a larger data base covering official 
recordings of violent and non-violent crime against foreigners. In particular, using state-level Right-Wing Extremism and the Well-Being of Immigrants 
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monthly data, they analyze empirically whether unemployment plays a crucial role for the 
occurrence of right-wing extremist crime, allowing for a non-linear effect of the 
unemployment rate. The results support the supposed non-linear relationship, i.e. if the 
unemployment rate is above the median, the number of non-violent crimes increases 
significantly; however, similar to the findings of Krueger and Pischke (1997), they could not 
establish comparable results with respect to violent crimes. In a recent paper, Siedler (2007) 
studies the driving forces behind right-wing extremism with a particular focus on family 
background and intergenerational transmission of values. His analysis examines the effects of 
paternal and maternal unemployment during a person’s childhood on right-wing attitudes and 
behavior later in life. Right-wing extremism is measured by information on the affinity to 
right-wing parties, participation in right-wing extremist groups, and anti-foreign sentiments. 
His results establish a strong and positively significant association between parental 
unemployment and various right-wing extremist outcomes for young Germans. 
While the effect of immigration on the native population has received a lot of attention, 
analyses of the well-being of immigrants are scarce in the economic literature. Sociological 
research, however,  provides some evidence. A thorough analysis of immigrants’ life 
satisfaction in 13 European countries based on three waves of the ESS is provided by Safi 
(2009). In the empirical analysis, she tests two hypotheses. The first is the so-called 
assimilation paradigm. Immigrants are expected to assimilate into the host country’s 
population over time (see e.g. Chiswick, 1978, and Borjas, 1985). Hence, one would expect to 
measure lower levels of life-satisfaction of immigrants, compared to that of natives, shortly 
after arrival in the host country, but differences should diminish with immigrants’ length of 
stay. In contrast to that, the second hypothesis assumes discrimination. Here, assimilation is 
assumed to be not only a matter of time. Instead, the host society also plays an active role 
through mechanisms of discrimination against some groups of immigrants. The hostility 
immigrants may experience in the receiving society not only solidifies their inferior position 
but also has a detrimental effect on their psychological well-being. The discrimination 
hypothesis predicts persisting differences in life satisfaction levels between immigrants and 
natives that would be more salient for the most stigmatized groups. Safi’s results suggest that 
there is no improvement of immigrants’ well-being over time; even after more than 20 years 
spent in the host country immigrants still report significantly lower life satisfaction than 
natives. When discrimination is controlled for, almost all coefficients of the ethnic variables 
decrease in magnitude or become statistically insignificant. Non-European immigrants, 
especially Africans, Turkish or Asians, seem to experience a lower life satisfaction directly Right-Wing Extremism and the Well-Being of Immigrants 
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related to their perception of discrimination. Thus, discrimination damages immigrants’ well-
being and strongly accounts for their lower levels of life satisfaction. 
3.  Methodology 
For the empirical analysis, we use the first 23 waves (1984-2006) of the SOEP.
3
The focus of our study is the effect of right-wing attitudes in the native population on the 
well-being of immigrants. Hence, we divide the sample into two subgroups: persons with 
German citizenship and foreigners with non-German nationality. This yields roughly 160,000 
observations for natives and 38,000 observations for foreigners. Our dependent variable is life 
satisfaction, which is measured on a 0 to 10 scale (where 0 denotes “not satisfied at all” and 
10 stands for “completely satisfied”). 
 We include 
all individuals residing in West Germany (incl. Berlin) and aged between 18 and 65. We 
restrict the sample to West Germany, since in 2008 only 3.5 percent of all foreigners living in 
Germany were residing in the East (Statistisches Bundesamt 2008), and because data for East 
Germany is only available since 1991. The age interval was chosen in order to evaluate the 
effects of right-wing extremism on the well-being of the working-age population in particular. 
In order to explain life satisfaction, we use a set of socio-demographic variables covering 
employment status, net household income, marital status, and level of education. Further 
individual heterogeneity is taken into account with a number of personal control variables 
comprising a person’s age, number of children, and having a household member in need of 
care. Finally, to control for other regional factors that may affect well-being we also include 
state-level GDP per capita and the state-level unemployment rate as control variables.  
For our study, we need a measure for the prevalence of right-wing and xenophobic attitudes 
at the regional level. As a proxy, we use state-level election results from elections to the 
federal parliament (Bundestag) and state legislatures (Landtage). Our measure of right-wing 
attitudes is the combined share of all votes given to any of the four major German right-wing 
parties (Deutsche Volksunion, Republikaner, Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, 
Partei Rechtsstaatlicher Offensive) in the respective state at the last federal or state election. 
The Deutsche Volksunion (DVU), the Republikaner (REP), the Nationaldemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands (NPD), and the Partei Rechtsstaatlicher Offensive (Schill-Partei – named after 
its founder Ronald Schill; dissolved in 2007) represent the far right of the Germany party 
                                                 
 
3 The data used in this publication were made available by the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) at 
the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin. The data were extracted using the Add-On-package 
PanelWhiz for STATA; see Haisken-DeNew and Hahn (2006) for details. Right-Wing Extremism and the Well-Being of Immigrants 
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system.  They postulate nationalistic  and racist ideas against racial, ethnic or religious 
minorities, especially against  foreigners. The German domestic intelligence agency 
(Verfassungsschutz) observes the  activities of the  DVU,  the  NPD, and parts of the  REP 
because they are considered a threat to the free and democratic basic order of the Federal 
Republic of Germany (Verfassungsschutz 2008). Since we know the precise date a person 
was interviewed, we can match each observation to the closest past election in the respective 
state. Using election results has the advantage that they are strictly exogenous for foreigners 
because they are not eligible to vote. 
To estimate the effects of right-wing  extremism  on the well-being of immigrants, we 
estimate the following equation: 
 
  1 ' it i it it t it LS RW X =+ + ++ αβ γ µε   (1) 
 
where LSit denotes person i’s life satisfaction at time t, αi is an individual fixed effect that 
takes account of individual unobserved heterogeneity, and RWit represents the percentage of 
votes given to right-wing parties in the preceding federal or state election in the person’s state 
of residence. The vector Xit  denotes the set of control variables that may potentially be 
correlated with individual well-being. µt represents the year dummies, and εit is a random 
error term. Since we are interested in the differential effect of right-wing extremism on 
German nationals and foreigners, we estimate equation (1) for both groups separately. 
We have two prior hypotheses regarding equation (1):  
1 0
Foreigner β <  
Foreigners are less satisfied with their life when the 
prevalence of right-wing extremism in their state of residence 
increases. 
11
Foreigner Native ββ <  
The life satisfaction loss is stronger for foreigners than for 
Germans, whereas the sign of the coefficient for German 
nationals is a priori ambiguous. 
 
The second question we want to answer empirically is whether the effects of right-wing 
attitudes in the host society vary with the immigrants’ level of education. In light of the recent 
changes in immigration law in order to increase recruitment of high-skilled foreigners, this 
question has important consequences for the effectiveness of such migration schemes if there 
are strong anti-foreign, xenophobic sentiments in the native population. If the life satisfaction Right-Wing Extremism and the Well-Being of Immigrants 
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of high-skilled immigrants reacts more strongly than that of foreigners with lower skills, this 
could have substantial economic consequences. These would apply to other countries  trying 
to attract high-skilled foreign workers as well (such as the US or Australia; see Bauer et al., 
2009, for an overview of the different attempts).  
To test for the right-wing influence on the life satisfaction of the better-educated 
foreigners, we estimate the following specification: 
 
  ( ) 12 ' it i it it it it t it LS RW RW HighEduc X =+ + ⋅ + ++ αβ β γ µε   (2) 
 
where HighEducit is a dummy variable with value 1 if the individual has an education time of 
more than 11  years (corresponding to a German high  school  diploma  or  a  leaving 
qualification from an intermediary school plus vocational training) and 0 otherwise. Hence 
the interaction term with RWit describes the effect of an increase in right-wing votes on highly 
educated individuals in addition to the effect of β1. 
Our hypotheses regarding equation (2) are: 
1
Foreigner β < 0 
A rise in the share of right-wing votes reduces the life 
satisfaction of foreigners. 
2 0
Foreigner β <  
The life satisfaction loss is higher for highly educated 
foreigners than those with lower levels of education. 
 
If the data confirm our hypotheses, right-wing attitudes and the resulting voting behavior 
could cause high economic costs and would operate against many industrialized countries’ 
efforts to increase immigration of high-skilled workers.  
4.  Descriptive Statistics 
We start the empirical analysis with some descriptive statistics regarding our key variables. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the voting results for right-wing parties broken down 
by West German states. As can be seen, there is a substantial variance in the share of votes 
going to the far right. In federal elections, which are held roughly every four years, the mean 
percentage of votes going to right-wing parties was between 1.1 percent (in Lower Saxony 
and North Rhine-Westphalia) and 2.9 percent in Berlin over the period 1983-2008. In all 
federal elections, the far right received at least some votes in all states (the minimum is Right-Wing Extremism and the Well-Being of Immigrants 
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strictly positive). Right-wing parties received their largest vote share in Bavaria (5.2 percent 
in 1990, of which 5.0 percent went to the Republikaner).  
Table 1: Vote shares received by right-wing parties, by state (1983-2008) 
mean max min mean max min
Berlin 2.9% 4.9% 1.9% 3.2% 7.5% 0.0%
Schleswig- Holstein 1.2% 2.0% 0.2% 2.4% 7.5% 0.0%
Hamburg 1.8% 4.5% 0.2% 4.7% 20.2% 0.0%
Lower Saxony 1.1% 1.6% 0.2% 1.9% 3.9% 0.0%
Bremen 1.7% 2.7% 0.3% 4.2% 7.7% 1.2%
North Rhine-Westphalia 1.1% 2.0% 0.2% 1.1% 1.8% 0.0%
Hesse 1.9% 3.6% 0.2% 1.5% 2.9% 0.0%
Rhineland-Palatinate 1.8% 3.1% 0.3% 2.1% 3.9% 0.1%
Baden-Wuerttemberg 2.4% 4.8% 0.3% 5.3% 11.8% 0.0%
Bavaria 2.2% 5.2% 0.3% 3.5% 4.9% 2.2%
Saarland 1.4% 2.4% 0.3% 2.2% 4.0% 0.7%
federal elections state elections
state
 
Source: German Federal Returning Officer (www.bundeswahlleiter.de), own calculations. 
On average, right-wing parties receive more votes in state elections than in federal 
elections. In most states, elections to state legislatures are also held about every four years, 
but are typically not synchronized with federal elections. Mean vote shares for the far right 
range between 1.1 percent (North Rhine-Westphalia) and 5.3 percent (Baden-Württemberg). 
In some state elections, none of the right-wing parties participated. Hence, the minimum vote 
received is strictly zero in some states. The maximum vote, however, is as high as 20.2 
percent in the city state of Hamburg (2001; the Schill-Partei received 19.4 percent) and 11.8 
percent in Baden-Württemberg (1992; 10.9 percent was given to the Republikaner). 
Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics of the sample. Since we restrict our attention to 
persons who are between 18 and 65 years old, the average age in our sample is 40.1 years for 
German nationals, while foreigners are, on average, almost two years younger. The average 
German national has 11.8 years of schooling (including vocational training). Foreigners have 
attended schools for only 9.7 years. The statistics further show that German nationals’ net 
household income (divided by the number of household members) is about 54 percent higher 
than that of foreigners. Foreigners have more children and live in larger households than 
German nationals. Moreover, their unemployment rate is higher and the employment rate 
lower. The share of persons who are married or cohabitating as well as the share of people 
who are living with a household member in need of care are very similar  between  both 
subpopulations. Right-Wing Extremism and the Well-Being of Immigrants 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
variable
mean value / 
share
standard      
error
mean value / 
share
standard      
error
age 40.1 (0.029) 38.2 (0.057)
years of education 11.8 (0.006) 9.7 (0.011)
net household income 
p.c. (in  Euro)
1027.1 (1.950) 666.6 (2.441)
married/cohabiting 0.80 0.78
number of children 0.7 (0.002) 1.1 (0.006)
persons living in 
household
3.0 (0.003) 3.8 (0.008)
household member in 
need of care
0.03 0.03
share unemployed 0.05 0.09
share employed 0.67 0.61
German nationals foreigners
 
Table 3 shows the mean life satisfaction of foreigners and German nationals broken down 
by education. Within each educational group, German nationals report higher life satisfaction 
scores than foreigners (7.06 vs. 6.96 for the low-educated, and 7.30 vs. 7.17 for the highly 
educated). Education is positively related with life satisfaction among both German nationals 
and foreigners. The differences between the life satisfaction scores of any two of the four 
groups are all significant at the 1%-level. 
Table 3: Mean life satisfaction scores (full sample: 1984 to 2006), by education 
    Foreigners  German nationals 










Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
The aim of our study is to illuminate how the prevalence of right-wing extremism and 
xenophobia affects the well-being of immigrants. Figure 1 makes a first pass by showing the 
mean life satisfaction of foreigners and German nationals in each of the 10 West German 
states, averaged over four-year periods from 1984 to 2006. As the figure shows, there appears 
to be a negative relationship between the share of right-wing votes at the state level and the 
mean life satisfaction of foreigners in that state. Hence, the well-being of foreigners is Right-Wing Extremism and the Well-Being of Immigrants 
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considerably lower in regions where right-wing parties perform successfully. An increase in 
the voting outcome of the far-right by 10 percentage points is associated with a reduction in 
life satisfaction by 0.3 points. In contrast, we do not find evidence for such an effect for the 
native population. German nationals’ mean life satisfaction does not seem to be correlated 
with the share of votes given to right-wing parties in their region (if anything, the correlation 
appears to be positive).  
Figure 1: Life satisfaction and right-wing extremism 
Note
5.  Regression results 
: Dots (crosses) denote the mean life satisfaction of natives (foreigners), and the vote share of right-wing parties in a particular 
West German state, averaged over the following periods: 1984-1987, 1988-1991, 1992-1995, 1996-1999, 2000-2003, and 2004-2006.  
To separate the influence of the prevalence of right-wing extremism on well-being from 
that of other regional and individual factors, we conduct regression analyses. Table 4 contains 
the results from regressing individual life satisfaction on the share of right-wing votes, 
educational attainment, and a set of regional and individual characteristics (corresponding to 
equations (1) and (2)). We restrict our attention to federal elections, but discuss the effect of 
state elections later. We use an ordinary least squares regression with individual fixed effects 
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Columns 1 and 2 refer to equation (1), i.e. they do not differentiate between different levels of 
educational attainment. Our results strongly support our hypotheses that a higher prevalence 
of right-wing extremism in a region, approximated by the share of votes given to right-wing 
parties, reduces the life satisfaction of foreigners living in that region. The coefficient is 
substantially negative and statistically significant at the 5%-level. Our results suggest that the 
life satisfaction of foreigners is reduced by 0.35 points if right-wing parties receive 10 
percentage points more votes.  
The results for German nationals, however, show a different picture. The coefficient on 
right-wing votes is negative, but its size is much smaller and not statistically significant. 
Hence, there does not seem to be a relation between sympathy for right-wing political ideas 
and average life satisfaction among the native population. The coefficients on our control 
variables have the expected signs. Being unemployed significantly reduces life satisfaction, 
while receiving more income raises it. Being married or living with a partner is associated 
with a significantly higher life satisfaction than being single. While the results in Table 2 
suggest that education is associated with higher life satisfaction, Table 4 shows that this 
positive effect disappears when we control for income and employment status. This suggests 
that education serves as a means to obtain more income and better employment prospects 
rather than being an end in itself. The influence of the state-level variables (GDP and crime 
rates) is small and only significant for the unemployment rate with respect to natives 
(corresponding to increased job insecurity and sympathy with the unemployed among the 
employed, see Clark et al. 2009) and for GDP with respect to foreigners (for which status 
considerations might play a role, see Clark et al. 2008).  
We now turn to specification (2), which includes the interaction effects between right-wing 
votes and educational attainment (see Table 4, columns (3) and (4)). The non-interacted effect 
of right-wing votes on the life satisfaction of foreigners is significantly negative (although 
smaller than in specification (1)). The interaction term between right-wing votes and the 
dummy indicating high educational attainment is also significantly negative. This suggests 
that, while the prevalence of right-wing extremism is negative for all foreigners, this effect is 
much more pronounced for immigrants with a higher level of education. The magnitude of the 
estimated coefficients implies that when the vote share of right-wing parties goes up by 10 
percentage points, the life satisfaction of low-educated foreigners falls by almost 0.28 points, 
while high-educated foreigners experience a drop of almost 0.67 points. We do not find any 
comparable effect for German nationals. The less educated are not affected by the election Right-Wing Extremism and the Well-Being of Immigrants 
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outcomes of right-wing parties, nor does there seem to be a differential effect between the 
educational groups.  
Table 4: Estimation results 







-3.499** -0.578 -2.820* -0.557
(1.410) (0.589) (1.451) (0.682)
-3.863** -0.044
(1.942) (0.691)
-0.013* 0.004 -0.013* 0.004
(0.008) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003)
0.010 -0.008* 0.009 -0.008*
(0.010) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004)
-0.789*** -0.723*** -0.790*** -0.723***
(0.034) (0.020) (0.034) (0.020)
0.083*** 0.090*** 0.084*** 0.090***
(0.023) (0.007) (0.023) (0.007)
0.114** 0.201*** 0.116** 0.201***
(0.054) (0.018) (0.054) (0.018)
0.238*** 0.289*** 0.237*** 0.289***
(0.049) (0.023) (0.049) (0.023)
-0.064 -0.058*** 0.025 -0.057**
(0.054) (0.022) (0.070) (0.026)
yes yes yes yes
yes yes yes yes
yes yes yes yes
0.050 0.040 0.051 0.040


















Estimation with education 
interaction
Dependent variable Life 
Satisfaction





Method FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS
Life 
Satisfaction




Note: OLS regressions with individual and time fixed effects. Other personal controls include widowed, 
divorced, number of children, out of labor force, self-employed, part-time employment, public employment, 10-
year age brackets, and having a household member in need of care. We abstain from presenting all coefficients 
of our control variables because the results are in line with previous studies (see Frey and Stutzer, 2002, 
Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004, or Frijters et al., 2004). Standard errors in parentheses. 
* denotes significance 
at the 10-percent-level, 
** at the 5-percent-level,
 *** at the 1-percent-level. 
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6.  Robustness checks 
To  check the robustness of these findings,  Table 5 provides results obtained from 
alternative estimations. The results from the OLS regressions presented in Table 4 have the 
appeal that coefficients  are  directly interpretable  as marginal effects. Despite the  ease of 
interpretation, a dependent variable that is obtained on a scale with a fixed number of points, 
such as the measure of life satisfaction, would be better dealt with using ordered response 
models.  Therefore, we also estimate specification (2) applying a probit-adjusted OLS 
(columns (1) and (2), see van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004)) and a conditional fixed 
effects logit regression (columns (3) and (4), see Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004)). 
These alternative estimation techniques support our findings obtained with the basic OLS. 
Right-wing extremism affects foreigners negatively, especially those with higher levels of 
education. No such effect is found for German nationals. In columns (5)-(8), we differentiate 
between men and women. Our findings show that the effect of right-wing extremism appears 
to be strongest for foreign men. For foreign women, both coefficients have the correct sign, 
but are statistically insignificant. In columns (9) and (10), we extend our sample and also 
include all persons who are older than 65, so that we cover ages 18 and above. This does not 
change our results compared to our findings in Table 4.  
We also test whether our results could be driven by interstate migration of persons between 
states with different levels of right-wing votes as compared to intrastate variations of the 
prevalence of right-wing extremism. To this  end, we keep only the  observations of each 
person for the state in which this person resided longest. Hence, respondents in our sample 
did not change states. The results in columns (11) and (12) show that our results are also 
robust with respect to this restriction. In columns (13)-(16), we use the outcomes from state 
elections instead of federal elections. The effect of right-wing voting on foreigners’ well-
being is also significant when we look at elections to state legislatures. The effects appear to 
be smaller than for federal elections, though. This suggests that federal elections are a better 
indicator of right-wing extremism or receive more public attention than elections at the state 
level. 
In general, the results show that an increase in the prevalence of right-wing attitudes and 
xenophobia reduces life satisfaction of foreigners noticeably. The results are robust to 
changes in the estimation method applied and to variations in the sample. The negative effects 
of right-wing extremism on the well-being of foreigners are even more pronounced for highly 
educated foreigners. We do not find evidence that the same relationship holds for German 
nationals.  Right-Wing Extremism and the Well-Being of Immigrants 
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Note: All regressions contain the same control variables as in Table 4. Standard errors in parentheses. 
* denotes 
significance at the 10-percent-level, 
** at the 5-percent-level,
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7.  Conclusion 
To cope with demographic change and to fill urgent shortages on their labor markets, aging 
economies rely on the inflow of young, well-educated migrants. To be attractive for such 
workers, it is not enough for countries to offer high wages and fast immigration processes. At 
least as important is that migrants can expect to move to a safe and open-minded society in 
which they can feel welcome and are able to enjoy a higher quality of life than in their 
country of origin. Xenophobia and other hostile attitudes towards migrants and other ethnic 
minorities among the native population, however, could constitute a strong deterrent to 
economically desirable migration. 
In this paper, we have provided evidence that the regional prevalence of anti-foreign 
sentiments reduces the quality of life of migrants in that region and thus lowers the 
attractiveness of regions for migration. Using individual panel data for Germany from 1984 to 
2006, we were able to show that the life satisfaction of migrants depends negatively on the 
strength of ring-wing extremism in their region of residence, as approximated by the vote 
share received by political parties of the extreme right in elections to federal and state 
parliaments. When distinguishing between different skill groups, we find that the better-
educated migrants suffer more from regional xenophobia than those with lower levels of 
education. We suspect that better-educated immigrants have a stronger desire to identify with 
and integrate in their host country, resulting in stronger disappointment and frustration if they 
experience rejection or even discrimination by the native population. If life satisfaction is a 
decisive variable in the choice of regions people want to move to, work in, and spend their 
life  in,  an increased prevalence of right-wing behavior may frighten off foreigners,  with 
potentially negative economic consequences for the region shunned by high-skilled migrants. 
These results suggest that recent attempts to make immigration more attractive to the high-
skilled are ill-fated if they do not simultaneously address the question of how to reduce hostile 
attitudes among the native population. 
To increase a region’s attractiveness for high-skilled migrants and international business 
investment, it is not sufficient for governments to engage in publicly sponsored business 
development or regional marketing. This paper’s findings suggest that it is also necessary to 
strengthen active crime prevention by supporting civil society’s actions and initiatives against 
xenophobia and right-wing violence and by raising the population’s consciousness of the 
benefits of immigration. Looked at it in  this way, suitable social and crime  policies are 
necessary complements to an efficient economic policy that makes regions and countries 
more attractive to high-skilled migrants and foreign business investment. Right-Wing Extremism and the Well-Being of Immigrants 
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